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What Role for Civil Society in Cross-
Regional Mega-Deals? A
Comparative Analysis of EU and US
Trade Policies
Quel rôle pour la société civile dans les accords de libre-échange transrégionaux :
étude comparée des politiques commerciales américaine et européenne
Jean-Baptiste Velut
1 The  Transpacific  Partnership  (TPP)  and  the  Transatlantic  Trade  and  Investment
Partnership  (TTIP) have been described as “next generation” agreements owing to their
very broad geographic scope and the many policy spheres upon which they encroach.
Indeed,  not only do “behind-the-border issues” venture into new areas ranging from
digital trade to supply chains and state-owned enterprises, but the economic weight and
geographic scale of these potential free trade zones also mean that they are likely to
create precedents for the global harmonization of trade rules. The fact that domestic laws
concerning  food  safety  or  environmental  standards  –  to  name  just  two  prominent
examples  –  that  were  once the product  of  democratic  processes  are  currently  being
renegotiated at the international level raises questions on the democratic governance of
cross-regional free trade agreements. This is why many civil society groups (consumer
associations, environmental organizations, labor unions etc.) have raised their voices to
demand greater inclusiveness and transparency in trade negotiations, thereby echoing
earlier debates surrounding previous forms of regionalism in Europe (e.g. the Maastricht
Treaty)  or  North  America  (CUSFTA,  NAFTA).  In  response  to  criticism  and  political
mobilization, governments have attempted to develop a number of policy tools to open
the trade policy process to civil society actors.1 The impact of these measures on the ends
and means of trade policy have, however, rarely come under academic scrutiny.
2 This  article  aims  to  assess  governmental  initiatives  to  include  new trade  policy
stakeholders  in  “next-generation”  FTA  negotiations  with  the  aim  of  developing  a
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systematic  approach to  evaluate  the  inclusiveness  and accountability  of  trade  policy
making. To do so, it proceeds in three parts. The first part reviews the literature on free
trade agreements to shed light on the paucity of studies concerned with the democratic
governance  of  cross-regionalism.  The  second  part  attempts  to  remedy  this  problem
through a theoretical discussion of civil society inclusion and participatory democracy in
the trade policy sphere. The third part uses this methodological toolbox to analyze the
respective experiences of the United States and the European Union within the context of
TTIP and TPP. My ambition is less to provide an exhaustive analysis of these two complex
sets of institutions and policies than to define a research agenda to assess the challenges
and stakes of bringing new trade stakeholders in policymaking. 
 
1. Cross-regional FTAs: new reality, old theory
3 From the transatlantic bridges of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) or the Mexican-EU
FTA, to competing free trade agreements in the Pacific like the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the TransPacific Partnership (TPP), the world economy
has witnessed the proliferation of ambitious mega trade deals bringing several regional
economies together. In one sense, these cross-regional alliances are only the latest phase
of  economic  globalization,  a  logical  step in  the  increasing interconnectedness  of  the
global economy.
4 Yet, as we argue in a forthcoming book,2 recent free trade agreements differ from earlier
waves of regionalism in at least two important regards. First, the geographic scope and
economic scale of so-called mega-deals – some of which aggregate 40% of world GDP –
have the potential to create important precedents for the regulation or deregulation of
markets worldwide. This is all the more notable since transcontinental trade negotiations
can bring together economies with different regulatory models and cultural traditions.
For instance, WTO disputes have revealed the tensions between Europe’s precautionary
principle  and  America’s  proclivity  for  scientific  evidence.  Asian  regional  integration
tends to favor regulatory cooperation while the United States favors the enforcement of
regulatory rights (Dent, cited in Deblock & Dagenais, 2015, p. 5). 
5 These tensions and conflicts have renewed old debates on the essence of regionalism.3
Some  continue  to  see  cross-regional FTAs  as  the  advent  of  a  “gated  globe”  i.e.  a
reiteration  of  the  famous  “spaghetti  bowl”  argument  whereby  the  global  economy
operates  short  of  its  full  potential  because  of  geo-economic  rivalries  and  regulatory
incoherence  (Bhagwati,  2008;  The Economist,  2013).  According to this  view,  the new
trade blocs may have contributed to derail multilateral trade negotiations under the Doha
Round (Baldwin, 2006; Low & Baldwin, 2009). 
6 Others  see  cross-regionalism  as  more  flexible  and,  as  a  result,  more  scalable  than
narrower forms of regionalism. As Deblock and Dagenais (2015) suggest, cross-regional
agreements  are  more  concerned  with  “interconnection”  than  “integration.”  In  fact,
under  transcontinental  trade  deals,  economic  blocs  have  become  so  “fuzzy”  (not  as
strictly  delineated  as  before)  and  “leaky”  (as  they create  canals  between traditional
regional blocs) that “spaghetti bowls” may become “building blocs on the path to global
free trade” (Baldwin, 2006). This perspective is what makes the terms of cross-regional
free trade agreements so important.
What Role for Civil Society in Cross-Regional Mega-Deals? A Comparative Analy...
Revue Interventions économiques, 55 | 2016
2
7 Second, the wide array of issue areas and “behind the border” provisions included in
twenty-first century trade agreements means that the circle of policy stakeholders has
dramatically expanded within the same country or set of countries.
8 Part of what makes so-called “free trade” agreements so controversial is the fact that
they are neither truly “free” nor only about “trade”. On the one hand, they contain a
number of provisions that either fail to level the playing field (e.g. agricultural subsidies)
or may very well  restrict trade and innovation (e.g.  rules of  origins,  evergreening of
patents under “TRIPS Plus” provisions).4 On the other, the regulatory scope of FTAs has
ventured into policy spheres that go well beyond trade tariffs. In short, trade agreements
have become international regulatory regimes in their own rights. 
9 This was admittedly the case when GATT members began focusing on non-tariff barriers
at the Tokyo Round.  Another turning point in this institutionalizing process was the
signature of NAFTA, whose provisions broke new ground in many issue areas, including
investment protection, intellectual property rights, government procurement, and if less
boldly, environmental protection and labor rights (Deblock, 2012; Velut, 2014). 
10 Today’s next generation agreements like TPP or TTIP go even further, making new forays
into the regulation of state-owned enterprises,  public services,  digital  trade and data
privacy,  culture  etc.  Thus,  the  range  of  trade  policy  stakeholders  has  considerably
expanded over the past two decades, which explains why a whole new set of actors – from
human rights and environmental NGOs, consumer organizations and Internet advocacy
groups – have felt the urge to express their grievances in a policy sphere long reserved to
business trade associations. The recent controversies surrounding fast track authority
and TPP in the United States  and the transnational  mobilization against  TTIP (often
renamed  TAFTA)  across  Europe  are  only  the  most  visible  attempts  of  civil  society
organizations to influence trade policy debates. 
11 Despite  the  rising  prominence  of  civil  society  groups  in  trade  debates,  academic
conceptualization  of  trade  policy  making  has  barely  started  to  acknowledge  the
expanding circle of trade policy stakeholders. 
12 Some  strands  of  trade  theory  have  never  been  equipped  to  capture  this  emerging
phenomenon. System-level approaches focus on the distribution of economic power at
the international level while state-level theories are generally more concerned with geo-
economic  rivalries,  strategic  trade  and  competitiveness  policy.5 Both  frameworks
generally  ignore  or  downplay  the  bottom-up  political  struggles  underpinning  trade
policymaking. 
13 More surprising is the insufficient attention that society-level or pluralist theories of
trade  policy  have  paid  to  the  emergence  of  the  new  stakeholders  of  free  trade
agreements. Empirically, this neglect is partly due to the prevailing influence of business
interests  on  trade  policymaking.  Theoretically,  it  stems  from the  persistence  of  old
dichotomies that continue to structure both academic and political conceptualizing of
international trade. 
14 First, if recent free trade agreements are misconstrued regulatory regimes encroaching
upon multiple policy spheres, trade policy outcomes cannot be confined to a Manichean
view opposing  free  trade  (good)  to  protectionism (bad).  Yet,  whether  they  focus  on
institutions of trade policy (Destler, 1986; Haggard, 1988; Goldstein, 1994; Dryden, 1995),
interest  group mobilization or voting determinants on trade laws (Baldwin & Magee,
2000; Karol, 2007), few analyses have questioned the relevance of this dichotomy. A good
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example is regression analysis of factors influencing trade policy attitudes. On the one
hand, trade scholars have developed complex models including a myriad independent
variables  to  assess  the  impact  of  education,  income  levels,  ideology,  interest  group
mobilization, etc. on attitudes towards trade (in the public or decision-makers). On the
other hand, dependent variables have often been reduced to binary representations of
free trade and protectionism.
15 Additionally,  increased  capital  mobility  means  that  factor-  or  sector-specific  trade
theories  are  no  longer  as  relevant  as  they  were,  when  losers  and  winners  of  trade
liberalization  could  be  neatly  divided  between  capital  vs.  labor  (Stolper-Samuelson
model)  or  import-competing  vs.  export-oriented groups  (Ricardo-Viner)6.  This  means
that there is a great need to understand the terms of trade agreements through a multi-
stakeholder approach.
16 To be fair, not all studies of contemporary trade politics have ignored the participation
and influence of  civil  society on decision-making.  In the United States,  these studies
focused  primarily  on  labor  and  environmental  issues.  Several  studies  examined  the
mobilization and achievements of labor unions (Shoch, 2001; Ross, 2000; French, 2002;
Compa, 2001; Moody, 1997), the participation of environmental organizations (Esty, 1998;
Audley, 1997; Vogel, 2000), while a few examined these stakes jointly (Destler & Balint,
1999; Dreiling, 2001). A few authors went beyond the scope of labor and environmental
issues to analyze the linkage between trade and human rights (Aaronson & Zimmerman,
2008), consumer rights (MacDonald & Marshall, 2010; Hilton, 2009), while others looked at
civil society at large (Aaronson, 2001; Brunelle, 2005; Brunelle et Dugas, 2009). 
17 Likewise,  studies  of  stakeholder processes in EU trade policymaking have been often
concerned with the scope and enforcement of labor provisions in free trade agreements
(Postnikov & Bastiaens, 2014; Oehri, 2014, Van den Putte, 2015) and more rarely, to civil
society in general (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007).
18 This literature is a welcome departure from the free-trade-versus-protectionism prism
that has confined the scope of trade theory. This article seeks to expand this emerging
field  in  four  respects:  1)  by  offering a  methodological  toolbox to  gauge  the  level  of
participation  of  new  stakeholders  at  various  stages  of  the  policy  process;  2)  by
highlighting the specificities of cross-regional FTAs and their implications for civil society
inclusion/exclusion; 3) by opening the discussion beyond labor and environmental issues;
4) by assessing the EU and US experiences from a comparative perspective in order to
delineate shortcomings and best practices. 
 
2. Participatory politics: Lessons from the bottom-up 
19 Before exploring the ways in which one might assess the inclusion of civil society in trade
policymaking,  it  is  important  to  clarify  the  meaning  of  what  is  often  an  ill-defined
concept.7 In this article, civil society is understood as the alternative voice to market and
state actors. In the words of the World Bank, it refers to “non-governmental and not-for-
profit  organizations that  have a presence in public life,  expressing the interests  and
values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious
or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a
wide array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
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labor  unions,  indigenous  groups,  charitable  organizations,  faith-based  organizations,
professional associations, and foundations” (World Bank, 2013). 
20 If  the  notion  of  participatory  democracy  is  rarely  discussed  within  the  trade  policy
sphere,  the  study  of  civil  society  inclusion  in  decision-making  has  a  long  academic
tradition to which this article cannot do justice. My purpose is to draw insights from this
rich literature to develop a theoretical framework that is congruent with the political
economy of international trade. Indeed, one of the central arguments of this article is
that despite the international or supranational essence of free trade agreements, there are
many lessons that can be drawn from the theory and practice of participatory democracy
at the local level.  
21 As with local forms of public participation in urban governance, any assessment of the
inclusion of civil society in trade policymaking requires asking three questions: 1) Who
participates? 2) How do they participate? 3) What impact do they have on policymaking?
Fung (2006)8 has operationalized these questions in three gradual dimensions designed to
assess the ends and means of participatory mechanisms: 1) Participant or “stakeholder”
selection;9 2)  Communication  and  decision;  3)  Authority  and  power.  Together,  these
qualitative variables serve as an insightful starting point to appraise the inclusiveness of
public policy such as trade policymaking. 
 
2.1 Stakeholder selection
22 Participant  selection is  a  crucial  concept  for  a  subject  as  broad as  civil  society.  Yet,
advocates  of  civil  society  inclusion,  in  their  enthusiasm for  political  openness  often
concentrate on how and to what effect policy stakeholders might participate rather than
who might participate.  This is particularly problematic since the pool of civil  society
participants may, from the start,  illustrate power dynamics – through mechanisms of
cooptation or exclusion – that are likely to have significant policy legacies. This means
that there is a need to reflect on how to identify legitimate stakeholders before defining
what role they might play in decision-making. 
23 There are three common approaches to selecting policy stakeholders: 1) an actor-based
approach  defined  by  the  economic  or  political  status  of  participants  (e.g.  public  vs.
private actors,  small vs.  large companies,  consumers vs.  producers);  2) a sector-based
approach that divides the economy between different markets; 3) a territorial approach
that  allocates  representatives  based  on geographic  criteria  (Cabannes,  2015).  These
approaches are not mutually exclusive and are sometimes combined either deliberately –
in order to favor political openness – or accidentally as a result of institutional layering.
Relying principally on an actor-based model, Fung (2006) offers a spectrum that ranges
from most inclusive process (involving e.g. the diffuse public sphere, self-selection or
random selection  of  political  participants)  to  most  exclusive  (from lay  stakeholders,
professional stakeholders, elected representatives to expert administrators). 
24 This  model  of  participatory  democracy  cannot  be  fully  transplanted  to  trade  policy
making for two reasons. First, some provisions in trade laws (e.g. intellectual property
rights, trade facilitation, etc.) have become so technical that they are not amenable to the
random selection  of  participants.  Second,  the  international  level  of  decision-making
provides fewer opportunities for participation than local participatory mechanisms, even
if  the  power  that  can  result  from political  access  is  obviously  greater.  Robert  Dahl
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describes this phenomenon as the “Chinese box” dilemma of participation and power in
relation to the scale of government (Dahl, 1967, cited in Fainstein, 2010, p. 17). 
25 Whether participatory mechanisms are actor-based or sector-based, issues of scale and
territoriality and representativeness cannot be avoided. Do smaller civil society groups
have access to the policy process? Whatever their negotiating mandates, do trade officials
accurately represent the interests of  all  localities? As is  often the case with business
interests,  aren’t smaller civil  society representatives more likely to be excluded from
consultation and decision-making? This question is particularly apt when considering the
“three-level game” of the European Union’s trade policy making, where the positions
defended by European trade negotiators at the international or cross-regional level (e.g.
EU-Mexican negotiations)  reflect  a  compromise  negotiated  first  at  the  national  level
(within a European country) before being aggregated at the European level.10 Thus, the
question of “who participates?” can have different answers whether one considers local
groups, national organizations or transnational (European) associations.
 
2.2 Modes of participation
26 One important contribution of Fung’s three-dimension model is to distinguish between
the process of political participation and its outcomes. Admittedly, access to the policy
process gives legitimacy to the cause of civil society groups and is therefore a first step on
the path to state responsiveness (Burstein et  al.,  1995).  However,  inclusion cannot be
conflated  with  meaningful  impact.  Indeed,  as  Arnstein’s  (1969)  seminal  “ladder  of
participation”  recognized,  certain forms of  participation are  akin to  tokenism.  Thus,
distinguishing processes  from outcomes  allows  for  a  more  in-depth inquiry  into  the
multiple institutional configurations that civil society organizations might use to seek
inclusion in policymaking, whether they have a real impact or not.11 
27 Conventional  modes  of  participation  range  from  public  consultation  to  testimonies,
negotiation and deliberation and technical  expertise  (Fung,  2006).  To  reflect  a  more
comprehensive picture of the potentialities of political participation for the exercise of
power, our understanding of the policy process must focus not only on what happens
before and during trade negotiations, but also after agreements have been signed and
ratified. In the trade policy sphere as in other issue areas, the involvement of civil society
groups in enforcement and monitoring is crucial to hold political operatives accountable. 
28 What  must  also  be  added  to  generic  models  of  participatory  democracy  is
acknowledgement that the cultural and institutional context may vary considerably from
one  case  study  to  another.  Indeed,  while  certain  forms  of  participation  may  seem
inherently  more  meaningful  than  others,  studies  in  organizational  theory  and
bureaucratic politics have long shown that each policy sphere has its own culture and
logic.  As a result,  institutional arrangements that ensure influence in one realm may
prove irrelevant in another. 
 
2.3 Power and authority
29 The study of political power has been a central subject in political science and sociology,
whether applied to state actors,  interest groups or social  movements.  Here,  power is
understood in the classic Weberian sense, i.e. as “the probability that one actor within a
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social  relationship will  be in a  position to carry out  his  own will  despite  resistance,
regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Weber, 1978, cited in Piven).12 
30 The forms of  political  participation discussed above –  before,  during and after  trade
negotiations – are often indicative of the nature of political influence. Assessing policy
stakeholders’  influence  requires  a  careful  study  of  trade  institutions  and  laws  using
process-tracing  methods.  This  article  is  primarily  concerned  with  measures  of  state
responsiveness but does not exclude the idea that the power of civil society groups like
environmentalists may also be conveyed outside government channels,  i.e.  through a
change in business practices like new forms of corporate social responsibility.  
31 My objective in the following sections is not only to analyze the processes and outcomes
of civil society involvement in trade policymaking but also to identify institutional gaps
where its presence is missing. As mentioned earlier, modes of communication are not
sufficient to understand more elusive forms of political influence – which some scholars
define as the “second face” of power. This implies greater focus on “non-decision
making,”  i.e.  institutional  rules,  ideological  representations  that  restrict  what
Schattschneider  calls  the  “scope  of  conflict”,  and  as  a  result,  the  terms  of  political
participation (Schattschneider, 1960, chapter 2; Bachrach & Baratz, 1962, p. 952). 
 
3. Civil society participation in trade policymaking: A
EU-US comparative analysis 
32 As an avatar of  new cross-regionalism,  TTIP is  an ideal  case study for analyzing the
inclusion  of  civil  society  groups  in  the  trade  policy  process.  Launched  in  2013,
international “trade” negotiations between the United States and the European Union are
structured along three main axes. First, market access includes traditional trade issues
like tariff barriers as well as issues with greater political implications like government
procurement.  Second, regulatory issues relate to non-tariff  barriers which both trade
partners  intend  to  overcome  through  either  mutual  recognition  or  regulatory
convergence. Finally, trade rules include a broad agenda ranging from the investment-
dispute settlement system to geographic  indications,  environmental  protection,  labor
rights etc. Given the broad scope of TTIP negotiations, many voices in Europe have called
for greater inclusiveness, transparency and accountability in trade negotiations. 
33 In the United States, consumer organizations, labor unions and environmentalists have
raised  similar  criticism  on  the  content  of  so-called  “next  generation”  free  trade
agreements,  but  have  done  so  primarily  within  the  context  of  the  TransPacific
Partnership and the renewal of fast track authority in 2015. In many respects, the key
features in TPP dovetail with TTIP’s blueprint and have been divided into five categories
that illustrate its extensive scope: 1) ensuring comprehensive market access; 2) making
TPP a  fully  regional  agreement  (e.g.  with regard to supply chains);  3)  solving cross-
cutting trade issues (i.e. regulatory issues); 4) tackling new trade challenges (e.g. digital
trade and green technologies); 5) creating a “living agreement” that can be updated as
new issues arise (USTR, n.d.).  Like TTIP, TTP’s reach “behind the borders” has raised
concern from a variety of policy stakeholders. The next section analyzes how US and EU
decision-makers have sought to incorporate these voices in trade policymaking.
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3.1 Stakeholder selection in US and EU trade policymaking
3.1.3 US trade policymaking
34 The selection of civil society participants in American trade policy is the direct reflection
of the byzantine nature of the decision-making process, which not only involves more
than a dozen government departments and agencies, but is also a balancing act between
the executive and legislative powers. As a result, stakeholder selection is a combination of
different approaches. 
35 Within the executive branch, the system of Trade Advisory Committees (TACs) provides
information and advice to the President in three fields: 1) “the negotiating objectives
before entering into a trade agreement”;  2) “the operation of trade agreements once
entered  into”;  3)  “other  matters  arising  in  connection  with  the  development,
implementation, and administration of the trade policy” (Trade Act of 1974, subchapter I,
part 3, §2155). TAC members have access to negotiating texts under strict confidentiality
rules. The TAC pyramid is a three-tier system divided, mostly on a sectoral basis, among
twenty-eight committees with a total membership that can include up to 700 advisors.
The latter are appointed either by the President (for the top-tier Advisory Committee for
Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN)) or by Cabinet members. 
36 Among  all  the  seats  (gathering  up  to  45  members)  of  ACTPN,  the  most  influential
committee, civil society has rarely held more than a handful of seats, generally reserved
for labor unions. The current membership includes 22 delegates, only three of which are
not from the private sector (two union representatives and one economist).13 
37 Non-profit organizations have greater access to the second tier and are concentrated in
two committees: the Labor Advisory Committee (LAC), where a vast majority of members
are union representatives (currently twenty-five out of twenty-six), and the Trade and
Environment  Policy  Advisory  Committee  (TEPAC),  where  environmentalists  and
consumer  organizations  can  be  well-represented:  currently  one  consumer  and  eight
environmental NGOs out of twenty-two members. For these two committees (especially
LAC), the stakeholder selection process is primarily actor-based (as opposed to sector-
based) to the extent that representatives are appointed as representatives of civil society,
while other members are chosen for the sector in which they operate (e.g. solar sector for
TEPAC). 
38 Finally,  the  third  tier  of  the  TAC  pyramid  is  made  up  of  Industry  Trade  Advisory
Committees (ITACs), which provide few opportunities for civil society inclusion. Even in
sensitive  sectors  directly  affected  by  offshoring  like  the  auto  or  the  textile  sectors,
workers  are  hardly  ever  represented.  Likewise,  environmental,  consumer  and digital
rights advocates have traditionally had little voice in ITACs despite the implications that
free trade agreements can have on environmental standards,  consumer protection or
Internet governance. For instance, it was only after undertaking legal action against the
executive, that NGOs managed to obtain a few seats in sectors where environmental and
health concerns are prominent (chemical  industry,  paper industry,  lumber and wood
industry) (Velut, 2009). 
39 Despite  the  expanding  regulatory  scope  of  “next  generation”  FTAs,  debates  on  civil
society inclusion in US trade policymaking have often been geared towards labor and
environmental issues as a legacy of the NAFTA debates. This has left few opportunities for
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nonprofit organizations like human rights NGOs, public health advocates or digital rights
advocacy groups,  even though they have become increasingly vocal  in trade debates
given  the  expanding  scope  of  free  trade  agreements.  Thus,  while  TPP  and  TTIP
negotiations  have made new forays  in  digital  trade  –  with potential  impact  on user
privacy,  net  neutrality  and  encryption  standards  –  the  Industry  Trade  Advisory
Committee on Information and Communications Technologies, Services, and Electronic
Commerce (ITAC8) has only one representative from a nonprofit organization out of 16
members.
40 The  Obama  administration  has  long  vowed  to  open  up  the  policy  process  to  new
stakeholders and to increase the number of participants from the non-profit sphere in
trade advisory committees (USTR, n.d.). To address concerns about the secrecy of TPP
negotiations, in 2014, the US government announced the creation of a new Public Interest
Trade Advisory Committee (PITAC) that would regroup “experts on issues such as public
health, development, and consumer safety” (USTR, 2014). Yet, almost two years after the
deadline for comments and initial nominations, PITAC has not been established, leaving
the  administration’s  promise  unfulfilled  throughout  the  entire  duration  of  TPP
negotiations.  As with TEPAC and LAC, the logic of stakeholder selection under PITAC
would be actor-based and result in another form of seclusion of civil society organizations
from the sector-based selection that characterizes other TACs.14 
41 Beyond  the  TAC  system,  the  Obama  administration  has  undertaken  a  range  of  new
stakeholder consultation initiatives within the context of TTIP. These measures include:
an online public consultation on US negotiating objectives that received more than 300
submissions; another online public consultation session conducted by the U.S.-EU High
Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG) that received “dozens of submissions”;
and a two-day hearing gathering 60 organizations,  more than a third of  which were
nonprofit organizations (USTR, 2014). At first sight, these initiatives broadened the scope
of participants that was traditionally confined by the restrictive nature of trade advisory
committees  –  even  though  the  connections  of  these  initiatives  with  actual  trade
policymaking remained unclear. 
42 If Congress is by definition more predisposed to territorial representation, stakeholder
selection in congressional hearings is mostly sector-based, yet remains opened to non-
profit  organizations  that  can file  requests  for  testimonies.  Most  groups  are  national
organizations, rather than local groups. No systematic study exists of the membership of
trade-related congressional  hearings  over  time,  but  unions are  a  regular  participant,
while environmentalists, consumer and public health advocates as well as human rights
NGOs  have  also  regularly  participated  in  congressional  hearings,  depending  on  the
specificities of trade law and/or the trade partner under consideration. 
 
3.1.2 EU trade policymaking
43 While  the US path to trade policy is  sinuous,  the European Union’s  decision-making
process is complicated by its supranational dimension. Although foreign policy remains a
divisive issue among EU partners, the conduct of EU trade policy is generally associated
with continuity and compromise. The EU Commission proposes a negotiating mandate to
the EU’s Council of Ministers, which approves it by a qualified majority vote if necessary –
although consensus is  usually the norm (Baldwin et  al. 2003,  29,  36).  Admittedly,  the
layered  institutional  apparatus  of  the  European  Union  is  not  immune  to  political
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thrombosis,  nor is  trade politics free of  tensions between EU members – agricultural
subsidies being a traditional bone of contention. Yet, when compared to the fragmented
and complex decision-making process of American trade policy – and more specifically its
separation of powers – the EU’s negotiating mandate in the trade sphere seems on firmer
grounds than one might expect. 
44 The debate on civil society inclusion in EU policymaking has a long history, whose stakes
are defined in the 2001 White Paper on Governance, as well as the Lisbon Treaty (2007).
Surprisingly, the EU’s definition of civil society can be ambiguous to the extent that it
generally,  but not systematically includes representatives of the private sector (Peels,
2012). 
45 Stakeholder selection occurs primarily at the initial consultation phase. The Directorate-
General for Trade (DG Trade) explicitly says that it “want[s] to hear civil society’s views
[and concerns] on trade issues” and has created a Civil Society Dialogue that holds regular
thematic meetings open to civil society organizations upon registration (DG Trade, 2014;
see  also  EU  Commission,  2015).  At  the  consultation  phase,  stakeholder  selection  is
generally an open process that is both actor- and sector-based. 
46 DG Trade understands “civil society” in a broad sense, which includes market actors like
business  and  professional  associations.  Thus,  the  Civil  Society  Dialogue  includes  a
majority of representatives from the business sector, either from European companies or
professional associations. Nonprofit organizations are albeit well represented. A recent,
well-attended  meeting  providing  an  update  on  TTIP  negotiations  included  135
participants, twenty of which came from a diverse pool of socially and environmentally
oriented NGOs (development, public health, environmental protection, digital rights etc.).
15 While several organizations were international federations, many were also national
delegations sent to Brussels. This tends to show that stakeholder selection in the EU is not
confined to the international level, even though smaller regional or local associations
were  not  represented.16 At  first  sight,  the  EU’s  regular  consultation  of  civil  society
organizations in open fora seems more inclusive that the US TAC system (Aissi & Peels,
forthcoming). On the other hand, stakeholder selection cannot be separated from the
modalities of participation and their potential effects, to which the next section turn.
 
3.2 Modes of participation, power and authority
3.2.1 US trade policy
47 The above discussion on stakeholder consultation has outlined the ways in which civil
society actors are selected to participate in the policy process. This section takes a closer
look at the processes and outcomes of these participatory mechanisms in the United
States and the European Union. 
48 On the  US  side,  civil  society  participation  occurs  primarily  before  and  during  trade
negotiations  through  TACs,  while  congressional  hearings  provide  opportunities  of
communication at various stages of the policy process depending on their objectives:
before the conclusion of negotiations (if they aim to discuss the stakes of the agreement),
after  a  trade agreement  has  been reached (before  ratification in  Congress)  or,  more
rarely,  when Congress deems it  necessary to assess  the impact  of  an agreement like
NAFTA. In both cases, participation is reduced to expressing preferences, i.e. one of the
least  intense  degrees  of  communication  and  decision  (Fung,  2006;  Arstein,  1969).
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Aggregation and bargaining may take  place  in  TACs  like  TEPAC,  when members  are
fundamentally at odds with one another.17 However, as the previous section has shown,
the structure of the TAC pyramid is designed to regroup civil society organizations in two
committees (LAC and TEPAC). As a result, TACs are generally homogenous enough so that
conflicts are neutralized.
49 Despite the regulatory stakes of both TPP and TTIP and the commitment of the Obama
administration  to  open  up  the  trade  policy  process  (USTR,  2015),  the  channels  of
participation within the TAC framework has not undergone any dramatic transformation
and has  therefore  only  began to  adapt  to  the  ever-expanding trade  agenda and the
commensurate pool of stakeholders concerned by new cross-regionalism. 
50 As a result,  the input of civil society organizations in TPP negotiations was relatively
circumscribed. This was perhaps less true in the environmental sphere than in others.
TEPAC’s  TPP report  begins by praising the diversity of  opinions expressed within its
committee and called the USTR to include civil society groups in other TACs (TEPAC,
2015, p. 4). Out of TEPAC’s twenty members involved in the drafting of the TPP report,
eight  represented  nonprofit  organizations,18 nine  were  industry  representatives  or
business advocacy groups, two were academic scholars and one was unaffiliated. As far as
the content of TPP is concerned, the report states that “the TPP substantially achieves
Congress’s  specific  environmental  negotiating  objectives”,  noting  that  “a  majority  of
TEPAC recognizes that the agreement makes great strides toward a number of critical
environmental protections for the TPP region” (ibid). However, in both the report itself
and its attachments, TEPAC members express concern over a number of shortcomings or
uncertainties, and more specifically on the resources available for the enforcement of
TPP’s environmental provisions and the scope of the Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement
(ISDS).19 
51 The LAC Report on TPP is less equivocal and argues in its opening statement that the
agreement  fails  to  meet  US  negotiating  objectives  and  as  a  result,  “should  not  be
submitted to Congress or, if it is, it should be quickly rejected” (LAC, 2015, p. 1). The
report goes on to demonstrate how TPP falls short of a long list of LAC’s objectives (from
provisions on currency manipulation to rules of origins, labor standards etc.). Although
the LAC’s dissenting views have been a common feature of FTA negotiations since NAFTA,
how  to  explain  that  a  President  who  promised  to  give  more  voice  to  civil  society
organizations in trade policy received such a unanimous rejection of TPP? This example
shows the complexity and challenges of civil society inclusion in policymaking. At first
sight, the LAC is entirely composed of union representatives and members of professional
associations (for a total of 19 members). Yet, unlike TEPAC’s positive perspective on civil
society inclusion, the LAC report denounces the limitations of the LAC process, and most
notably its  frustration with restrictions on information (e.g.  bracketed text or tabled
positions)  as  well  as  the  USTR’s  failure  to  consult  the  LAC regarding  the  side  labor
agreements negotiated with Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. 
52 A second form of civil society participation is one that takes place after trade agreements
have been implemented, i.e. through monitoring and enforcement. One example was the
participation  of  labor  unions  and  environmentalists  under  NAFTA’s  North  American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation (NAALC). As many studies have revealed, this attempt to include civil
society in the implementation phase of the trade policy process came short of meaningful
impact owing to institutional weaknesses and budgetary constraints.20 While TPP breaks
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new ground in the environmental and labor spheres and creates opportunities for civil
society  inclusion ex-post,  its  labor  and environmental  chapters  hardly  give  nonprofit
actors a strong role in enforcement. 
53 TPP’s labor chapter creates mechanisms for public submission but establishes no formal
institution  for  monitoring  and  enforcement  except  for  the  intergovernmental  Labor
Council, which is reserved for senior governmental officials. TPP consultation on labor
issues is also confined to governmental channel.21 Similarly, TPP’s environmental chapter
encourages its trade partners to use consultative mechanisms such as domestic advisory
groups to assist in the implementation of its environmental provisions.22 Yet, its Citizen
Submission Process makes it difficult to challenge the non-enforcement of environmental
standards, first by putting the burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate negative trade effects
of such violation, and second, by directing submissions toward governments and not to
an independent panel as is the case for the Investor-State Dispute System. Finally, as
during the negotiating phase, civil society input in the implementation phase remains
confined to the environmental and labor chapters, giving little scope to the participation
of other stakeholders in enforcement.
 
3.2.2 EU trade policy 
54 As mentioned earlier, the European Union has also encouraged civil society inclusion in
trade policy debates through consultation. The Civil Society Dialogue (CSD) remains the
central participatory mechanism used by the Commission. In fifteen years, DG Trade has
organized a total of 165 meetings, with an average of 26 meetings per year since 2008. The
wealth of information provided in the CSD are congruent with the EU’s transparency
objectives and have contributed to improve public access to information on EU trade
policy. 
55 
Yet, in effect, DG Trade’s stakeholder consultation efforts have had little impact on the
trade  policy  process.  This  comes  primarily  from  the  disconnect  between  the  EU’s
stakeholder consultation mechanism and the actual conduct of EU trade negotiations. In
fact,  the European Union’s  own assessment  of  the CSD emphasized the gap between
process and outcomes inherent to EU trade policymaking (European Commission, 2014).
The study stressed that “the CSD does not currently generate clear outputs to inform
policy” and recorded significant levels of dissatisfaction among civil society participants
(p. 8, 14). Perhaps even more indicting was the premise that the CSD did not have clearly
established objectives beyond the goals of relaying information. This straight conclusion
from an impact-assessment without any particular ideological proclivity for civil society
inclusion in trade policymaking goes a long way in answering the question of potential
power and authority of policy stakeholders through the CSD. 
56 Other channels of direct participation have also been constrained. Thus, the European
Council’s  Trade Policy Committee advising and assisting DG Trade in policymaking is
reserved to Cabinet-level members of all EU member countries. This does not mean that
civil society’s voice is never conveyed by national trade officials. Yet, paradoxically, as
one French Foreign Ministry official confessed in an interview with the author, the fact
that  trade  policy  has  been  delegated  to  the  EU Commission  means  that  the  French
government does not feel  mandated to coordinate civil  society outreach efforts  on a
national  level.  Thus,  the  three-level  game  of  EU trade  policymaking  constrains  civil
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society  input  to  well-organized  groups  that  have  enough  information  and  material
resources to act (whether on a temporary or permanent basis) in Brussels. 
57 While civil  society inclusion in EU trade policymaking does not extend to what Fung
(2006) calls “aggregation and bargaining”, DG Trade has been developing initiatives to
improve  input  from  non-state  actors  in  the  implementation  phase.  The  sustainable
development  chapter  (13)  of  the  EU-Korea  agreement  development  included  new
measures  for  stakeholder  participation  at  the  implementation  phase.  Each  party
established a Domestic Advisory Group (DAG) on sustainable development composed of
civil  society organizations (including business interests)  to advise government on the
implementation of chapter 13. DAGs appoint representatives that take part in the annual
meetings  of  the  Civil  Society  Forum,  which  also  plays  an  advisory  role  in  the
implementation of  the  EU-Korea FTA.23 Not  unlike  the  TPP labor  and environmental
provisions, evidence is scarce that these measures have had a tangible impact on the
enforcement of the sustainable development chapter.24
58 As of this writing it is too early to know whether these mechanisms will be incorporated
in TTIP but given the stormy controversies surrounding the negotiations, it is hard to
envision  why  TTIP  would  not  build  upon  the  EU’s  new framework  for  civil  society
inclusion at both consultation and implementation phases. 
 
4. Conclusion
59 This article has offered a framework to analyze the modalities and outcomes of civil
society  participation  in  trade  policy  throughout  the  decision-making  process.  It  has
shown  that  despite  growing  awareness  on  the  broader  implications  of  free  trade
agreements and new measures to open the trade policy process, the overall record of civil
society inclusion has been mixed in both the US and the European Union. This stems from
a  number  of  institutional and  political  factors.  First,  both  the  US  and  EU  have
concentrated their efforts to include civil society organizations before trade negotiations
as  opposed  to  during or  after.  Indeed,  evidence  shows  that  stakeholder  consultation
processes have become more and more common in both TPP and TTIP negotiations. Yet,
in America as in Europe, there is still little evidence that these processes have had a direct
impact on the design of FTAs: the LAC’s rejection of TPP in the US and the dissatisfaction
of  European  participants  in  stakeholder  consultation  are  two  examples  of  the
shortcomings of current consultation processes. 
60 Second, the impact of civil society organizations on the enforcement of FTA provisions
has been hampered by the very design of monitoring institutions, and more specifically
the advisory functions of civil society groups that has left government officials free from
ignoring certain recommendations. 
61 Third, discussions on civil society participation on both sides of the Atlantic have been
primarily focused on environmental and labor issues, giving in effect much less space to
other issue areas in which civil society organizations can play a key role such as public
health  or  digital  rights.  In  other  words,  when  it  comes  to  democratic  governance,
participatory  mechanisms  in  so-called  “next  generation”  agreements  have  remained
stuck to the “previous generation” of FTAs in both the United States and the European
Union.
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62 In short, whether in Washington or Brussels, progress has not been commensurate with
the political efforts undertaken to improve stakeholder participation initiatives. Thus,
the democratization of trade policymaking continues to raise questions in the context of
TPP and TTIP given the far-reaching scope of the negotiations in the context of new
cross-regionalism.
63 Admittedly,  the  questions  and claims  raised  in  this  short  essay  would  require  more
systematic analysis of both the US and EU trade policy processes. Examples of issues that
would  require  more  attention  are  the  evolution  of  the  membership  of  stakeholder
meetings over time, the resonance of political grievances or frames articulated by civil
society groups, non-decision-making processes in both Washington and Brussels etc.  In
this  sense,  this  paper  is  only  a  call  for  greater  consideration  of  the  democratic
governance of EU and US trade policymaking, an urgent topic given the fast development
of ambitious FTAs across the world.  
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aoki, Naomi (2015). Adaptive governance for resilience in the wake of the 2011 Great East Japan
Earthquake and Tsunami, Habitat International. 
Arnstein, Sherry (1969). A Ladder of Citizen Participation, Journal of the American Institute of
Planners, vol. 35 n°4, pp. 216-24.
Aaronson, Susan (2001). Taking Trade to the Streets. The Lost History of Public Efforts to Shape
Globalization, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press.
Aaronson, Susan (2015). Working by Design New Ideas to Empower US and European Workers in
TTIP, Institute for International Economic Policy: https://www.gwu.edu/~iiep/events/
Working_for_All/summary.pdf
Aissi, Jonas & Rafael Peels (forthcoming). Civil Society Participation in EU and US Trade Politics –
TTIP and TPP explained, inJean-Baptiste Velut, Louise Dalingwater, Vanessa Boullet & Valérie
Peyronel (ed.) Understanding Mega Trade Deals: The Political and Economic Governance of New
Crossregionalism.
Allen, Linda J. (2012). The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: Has It
Fulfilled Its Promises and Potential? An Empirical Study of Policy Effectiveness,  Colorado Journal
of International Environmental Law and Policy vol. 23, n°1, pp. 122-199.
Audley, J. J. (1997). Green Politics and Global Trade: NAFTA and the Future of Environmental Politics.
Washington, Georgetown University Press.
Baldwin, Richard (2006). Multilateralising Regionalim: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the
Path to Global Free Trade, NBER Working Paper Series n°12545.
Baldwin, Richard E., and Elena Seghezza (2010). Are Trade Blocs Building or Stumbling Blocs?, 
Journal of Economic Integration,vol. 25, n°2, pp. 276-97. 
What Role for Civil Society in Cross-Regional Mega-Deals? A Comparative Analy...
Revue Interventions économiques, 55 | 2016
14
Baldwin, R. E., & Magee, C. S. (2000). Congressional Trade Votes. From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track
Defeat. Washington, DC, Institute for International Economics.
Baldwin, Matthew, John Peterson, and Bruce Stokes. (2003). Trade and Economic Relations. In
John Peterson, and Mark A. Pollack (ed.) Europe, America, Bush. Transatlantic Relations in the Twenty-
First Century, London/New York, Routledge.
Bhagwati, Jagdish N. (2008). Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine
Free Trade. Oxford, Oxford UP. 
Brunelle, D. (2005). Bilan de la consultation populaire sur le projet de la ZLEA. In S. Barria et F.
Rochat (dir.). Mobilisations des peuples contre l’ALCA-ZLEA. Geneva, CETIM, pp. 129-144.
Brunelle, D. et Dugas, S. (2009). Civil Society Organizations against Free Trade Agreements in
North America, in Jeffrey M. Ayres & L. Macdonald (dir.). Contentious Politics in North America.
National Protest and Transnational Collaboration under Continental Integration. London, Palgrave
Macmillan, pp. 57–73.
Burstein, Paul, Rachel L. Einwohner, and Jocelyn A. Hollander (1995). The Success of Political
Movements: A Bargaining Perspective, in J. Craig Jenkins, and Bert Klandermans (ed.), The Politics
of Social Protest. Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements. Minneapolis, University of
Minnesota Press, pp. 275-295. 
Cabannes, Yves (2015). The Garden Cities Manifesto, Dialogic Workshop on Progressive Cities in
Europe and Asia, National University of Singapore, February 12-13.
Compa, L. (2001). Free Trade, Fair Trade and the Battle for Labor Rights. In L. Turner, Harry C.
Katz, and Richard W. Hurd (Ed.), Rekindling the Movement: Labor’s Quest for Relevance in the 21st
Century. Ithaca, ILR Press.
Compa, L. (2001). NAFTA’s Labor Side Agreement and International Labor Solidarity. Antipode vol.
33, n°3, pp. 451-467. 
Dahl, Robert A. (1967). The City in the Future of Democracy. The American Political Science Review,
vol. 61, n°4, pp. 953-970.
Darves, D., & Dreiling, M. (2002). Corporate Political Networks and Trade Policy Formation. 
Humanity & Society, vol. 26, n°1, pp. 5-27. 
Davenport, Coral (2014). Administration Is Seen as Retreating on Environment in Talks on Pacific
Trade, The New York Times, 15 January: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/politics/
administration-is-seen-as-retreating-on-environment-in-talks-on-pacific-trade.html 
Deblock, Christian (2010). La politique commerciale américaine. Promenade guidée dans le jardin
des theories, Recherches internationales, vol. 88, octobre-de ́cembre, pp. 127-154.
Deblock, Christian (2012). Intégration en profondeur et nouvelle diplomatie commerciale. Les
leçons de l’ALENA, Cahier de Recherche CEIM : https://politique.uqam.ca/upload/files/PDF/
Intgration-Rennes-final.pdf
Deblock, Christian, and David Dagenais (2015). De l’intégration à l’interconnexion : Le Partenariat
Transpacifique: http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/deblocketdagenaistpp-version_finale.pdf
European Commission (2014), Evaluation of DG TRADE’s Civil Society Dialogue in order to assess
its effectiveness, its efficiency and relevance:  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/
december/tradoc_152927.pdf 
Dent, Christopher M. (2006). New Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific. Basingstoke, Palgrave
MacMillan. 
What Role for Civil Society in Cross-Regional Mega-Deals? A Comparative Analy...
Revue Interventions économiques, 55 | 2016
15
Destler, I. M. (1986). Protecting Congress or Protecting Trade?, Foreign Policy, vol. 62, pp. 96-107.
Destler, I. M., and Peter J. Balint. (1999). The New Politics of American Trade: Trade, Labor, and the
Environment. Washington, Institute for International Economics.
Directorate-General Trade (2014). Dialogues: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/civilsoc/csd_proc.cfm
Dreiling, M. (2001). Solidarity and Contention. The Politics of Security and Sustainability in the NAFTA
Conflict. New York / London, Garland Publishing.
Dryden, S. (1995). Trade Warriors. USTR and the American Crusade for Free Trade. New York/Oxford,
Oxford University Press.
Delp, L., Marisol Arriaga, Guadalupe Palma, Haydee Urita, and Abel Valenzuela. (2004). NAFTA’s
Labor Side Agreement: Fading into Oblivion?, UCLA Labor Center: http://www.ggt.uqam.ca/IMG/
pdf/LindaDelpnafta.pdf
Esty, D. C. (1998). Environmentalists and Trade Policymaking. In A. Deardoff, and R. Stern (Ed.), 
Representation of Constituent Interests in the Design and Implementation of US Trade Policies, Ann Arbor,
University of Michigan Press, pp. 201-20.
European Commission (2012). Proposal for new enforcement framework for international trade
rules: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-1006_en.htm
European Commission (2015). Trade for all Strategy. Towards a more responsible trade and
investment policy: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf
Fainstein, Susan S. (2011). The Just City. Cornell UP.
Fickling, Meera and Jeffrey J. Schott (2011). NAFTA and Climate Change, Washington, Peterson
Institute.
French, J. D. (2002). From the Suites to the Streets: The Unexpected Re-emergence of the ‘Labor
Question’ 1994-1999. Labor History, vol. 43, n°3, pp. 285-304.
Fung, Archon (2006). Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance. Public Administration
Review, Special Issue, December, pp. 66-75.
Goldstein, J. (1986). The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection, American Political
Science Review, vol. 80, n°1, pp. 161-184.
Grim, Ryan & Zach Carter (2014). Here’s Why Obama Can’t Get Democrats to Back His Trade Deal. 
The Huffington Post, 20 Februrary:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/20/michael-froman-
democrats_n_4820363.html
Helleiner, G. K. (1977). Transnational Enterprises and the New Political Economy of U.S. Trade. 
Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 29, n°1, pp. 102-116.
Haggard, S. (1988). The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act of 1934. International Organization, vol. 42, n°1, pp. 91-119.
Hilton, Matthew (2009). Prosperity for All. Consumer Activism in an Era of Globalization. Ithaca, Cornell
UP.
Hiscox, M. J. (2001). Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the
Politics of Trade, International Organization, vol.55, n°1, pp. 1-46.
Karol, D. (2007). Does Constituency Size Affect Elected Officials’ Trade Policy Preferences, The
Journal of Politics, vol. 69, n°2, pp. 483-494.
Low, Patrick, & Richard E. Baldwin (2009). Multilateralizing Regionalism. Cambridge, Cambridge UP.
What Role for Civil Society in Cross-Regional Mega-Deals? A Comparative Analy...
Revue Interventions économiques, 55 | 2016
16
Kate Macdonald & Shelley Marshall (2010). Fair Trade, Corporate Accountability and Beyond :
Experiments in Global Justice, Burlington, Ashgate, 2010.
Milner, Helen V. (1999). The Political Economy Of International Trade. Annual Review of Political
Science vol. 2, n°1, pp. 91-114.
Milner, H. V., & Yoffie, D. B. (1989). Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy
and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands. International Organization, vol. 43, n°2, pp. 239-272.
Moody, Kim (1997). Workers in a Lean World. New York, Verso.
Odell, John S. (1990). Understanding International Trade Policies: An Emerging Synthesis, World
Politics, vol. 43, n°1, pp. 139-167.
Oehri, M. (2014). Comparing US and EU labour governance “near and far” – hierarchy vs
network?, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 22, n°5, pp. 731-749.
Panagariya, Arvind (1999). The Regionalism Debate: An Overview. The World Economy World
Economy, vol. 22, n°4, pp. 455-476. 
Patterson, L. A. (1997). Agricultural Policy Reform in the European Community: A Three-Level
Game Analysis. International Organization, vol. 51, pp. 135-165.
Peels, Rafael (2012). Facing the paradigm of non-state actor involvement: the EU-Andean region
negotiation process. Doctoral dissertation: Ku Leuven.
Piven, Frances Fox & Richard A. Cloward (2005). Rule Making, Rule Breaking and Power, in
Thomas Janoski (ed.). The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization.
Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2005, pp. 33-53. 
Postnikov, E. and Bastiaens, I. (2014). Does dialogue work? The effectiveness of labor standards in
EU preferential trade agreements. Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 21, n°6, pp. 923–940.
Shoch, J. (2001). Organized Labor versus Globalization. In L. Turner, Harry C. Katz, and Richard W.
Hurd (Ed.), Rekindling the Movement: Labor’s Quest for Relevance in the 21st Century, Ithaca, ILR Press,
pp. 275-313.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2013). The Free Trade Charade. Project Syndicate, 4 July: http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/transatlantic-and-transpacific-free-trade-trouble-by-joseph-e--
stiglitz 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2006). Making Globalization Work. New York, W.W. Norton, 2006.
Stokes, B., & Choate, P. (2001). Democratizing U.S. Trade Policy. New York, Council on Foreign
Relations.
Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee (TEPAC) (2015), The U.S.-Trans-Pacific
Partnership Free Trade Agreement: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Trade-and-
Environment-Policy-Advisory-Committee.pdf 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) (n.d.). Outlines of TPP: https://ustr.gov/tpp/outlines-
of-TPP 
USTR (2014). Stakeholder Consultations, Investment and the T-TIP: https://ustr.gov/about-us/
policy-offices/press-office/blog/2014/March/Stakeholder-Consultations-Investment-and-the-
TTIP 
USTR (2015). Transparency and the Obama Trade Agenda: https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/january/fact-sheet-transparency-and-obama 
What Role for Civil Society in Cross-Regional Mega-Deals? A Comparative Analy...
Revue Interventions économiques, 55 | 2016
17
Van den Putte, L. (2015). Involving Civil Society in Social Clauses and the Decent Work Agenda, 
Global Labour Journal, vol. 6, n°2, pp.  221-235.
Velut, Jean-Baptiste (2009). ‘Free’ or ‘Fair’ Trade: The Battle for the Rules of American Trade
Policy from NAFTA to CAFTA (1991-2005). Doctoral Dissertation (Sorbonne Nouvelle University of
Paris/City University of New York).
Velut, Jean-Baptiste (2014). La gouvernance du smart economic power, in M. Kandel & M.
Quessard-Salvaing (ed.), Les strategies du smart power américain. Etudes de l’IRSEM vol. 32, pp.
199-214.
Velut, Jean-Baptiste (2015), “Trade Policy” entry in International Encyclopedia of Social and
Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Elsevier.
Velut, Jean-Baptiste, Louise Dalingwater, Vanessa Boullet & Valérie Peyronel (forthcoming), 
Understanding Mega Trade Deals: The Political and Economic Governance of New Crossregionalism.
Vogel, D. (2000). The Environment and International Trade. Journal of Policy History, vol.12, n°1,
pp. 72-100.
Weber, Max (1978). Economy and Society. Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press.
Winters, L. Alan (1996). Regionalism versus Multilateralism. World Bank Policy Research Working
Papers vol. 1687: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-1687 
Wold, Chris (2016). Empty Promises and Missed Opportunities: An Assessment of
the Environmental Chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: https://
law.lclark.edu/live/files/20857-assessing-the-tpp-environmental-chapter




1.  The notion of civil society is defined in section 2.
2.  Velut et al. (2016).
3.  For a review of the debate,  see Winters (1996),  Panagyria (1999) and Baldwin & Seghezza
(2010). 
4.  See Stiglitz (2004) and (2013).
5.  For an overview, see Ikenberry et al.  (1988),  Odell  (1994),  Milner (1999),  Deblock (2010) or
Velut (2015).
6.  For an attempt to bridge this divide, see Milner & Yoffie (1989) and Hiscox (2001).
7.  For an extensive and insightful discussion of the notion of civil society, see Peels (2012, p.
9-11).
8.  See also Aoki (2015).
9.  The term of policy “stakeholder” is more common in the trade sphere and will therefore be
preferred to Fung’s “participant” for the rest of the article. Although it is often used to include
market actors, its meaning in the present article will be restricted to civil society organizations.
10.  The  idea  of  “three-level  game” (Patterson,  1997)  builds  upon  Putnam’s  seminal
conceptualization of international trade negotiations. For Putnam, international politics can be
conceived as  a  two-level  game:  at  the  national  level  (Level  II),  domestic  actors  pursue  their
interests  by  pressuring  the  government  while  politicians  seek  political  support  by  building
What Role for Civil Society in Cross-Regional Mega-Deals? A Comparative Analy...
Revue Interventions économiques, 55 | 2016
18
coalitions;  at  the  international  level  (Level  I),  national  governments  strive  to  satisfy  their
domestic constituencies, while minimizing the adverse effects of foreign developments.
11.  This does not mean that the two dimensions need to be discussed separately, as processes
and outcomes are irremediably interconnected. The next section will examine them jointly.
12.  For a critical analysis of the concept of power, read Piven & Cloward (2005).
13.  The current membership of major TACs is available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/advisory-
committees
14.  According to the Huffington Post, the idea of a dedicated non-profit TAC emanated from
corporate interests that saw this institutional reform as a way to preserve TACs from criticism
emanating from civil society organizations (Grim & Carter, 2014). For more information on the
impact of the TAC system on policymaking, see Darves & Dreiling (2002); Stokes & Choate (2001)
and Velut (2009).
15.  The  full  list  of  participants  is  available  at:  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/civilsoc/
meetdetails.cfm?meet=11443#parts 
16.  One should, however, bear in mind that given the different sizes of European countries, a
national association coming from Denmark may be equivalent to what a regional association
might look like in a larger European country like Germany.
17.  This was the case for TEPAC’s report on DR-CAFTA under the Bush administration (Velut,
2009). 
18.  Environmental NGOs included two organizations that had endorsed trade deals in the past:
the World Wildlife Fund broke ranks with other environmental groups to support NAFTA in the
early  1990s,  while  the  Humane Society  was  an isolated supporter  of  DR-CAFTA in  2003-2004
(Velut, 2009). Despite its nonprofit status, the Competitive Enterprise Institute is here considered
as a business advocacy group for its aversion to environmental regulation and its proclivity for
market solutions.
19.  For a critical analysis of TPP’s environmental chapter, see Wold (2016).
20.  For a review of NAFTA’s labor agreement, see e.g. Compa (2001b) and Delp et al. (2004).
For a review of the literature on the NAAEC, see Allen (2012, p. 131-137).
21.  See  TPP’s  chapter  19  on  labor:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-
Labour.pdf   
Additionally, the Department of Labor (DOL)’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs also provides
advice on how to implement the labor provisions of all FTAs yet has no enforcement power. For a
discussion, see Van den Putte (2015).
22.  See  TPP’s  chapter  20  on  the  environment:  https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-
partnership/environment-a7f25cd180cb#.dtkd80cff
23.  The text  of  the EU-Korea FTA is  available  at:  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/
ALL/?uri=OJ%3AL%3A2011%3A127%3ATOC 
24.  For a discussion of civil society participation in the EU-Korea and KORUS FTAs, see Van den
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ABSTRACTS
The Transpacific  Partnership  (TPP)  and  the  Transatlantic  Trade  and  Investment  Partnership
(TTIP) have been described as “next generation” agreements owing to their broad geographic
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scope  and  the  many  regulatory  spheres  upon  which  they  encroach.  This  article  assesses
governmental initiatives to include new trade policy stakeholders in the design of new cross-
regional free trade agreements. The objective is to develop an analytical framework to evaluate
the inclusiveness and accountability of trade policymaking. To do so, the paper proceeds in three
parts. The first part reviews the literature on free trade agreements to shed light on the relative
“paucity of studies concerned with the democratic governance of “new cross-regionalism.” The
second part attempts to remedy this problem through a theoretical discussion of civil society
inclusion  and  participatory  democracy  in  the  trade  policy  sphere.  The  third  part  uses  this
methodological  toolbox  to  analyze  the  respective  experiences  of  the  United  States  and  the
European Union within the context of TTIP and TPP. My ambition is less to provide an exhaustive
analysis of these two complex sets of institutions and policies than to define a research agenda to
assess the challenges and stakes of bringing new trade stakeholders in trade policymaking. 
Le  Partenariat  Trans-Pacifique  (PTP)  et  le  Partenariat  Transatlantique  de  Commerce  et
d’Investissement (PTCI) ont été décrits comme des accords de « nouvelle génération » en vertu de
leur portée géographique très vaste et des multiples sphères réglementaires concernées par les
négociations.  Le  présent  article  évalue  les  initiatives  gouvernementales  visant  à  inclure  de
nouvelles  parties  prenantes  de  la  politique  commerciale  dans  la  conception  des  nouveaux
accords de libre-échange transrégionaux. L’objectif est de développer une grille d’analyse pour
évaluer  l’inclusivité  et  la  comptabilité  du processus  décisionnel  de  la  politique commerciale.
L’article est divisé en trois parties. La première dresse un état de la littérature sur les accords de
libre-échange en soulignant l’absence relative d’études portant sur la gouvernance démocratique
du « nouveau transrégionalisme ». La deuxième partie tente de remédier à ce problème à travers
une discussion théorique de l’inclusion de la société civile et de la démocratie participative dans
la sphère commerciale.  La troisième s’appuie sur ce cadre méthodologique pour analyser les
expériences respectives des Etats-Unis et de l’Union Européeenne dans le contexte du TPP et du
PTCI.  Mon  ambition  est  moins  de  fournir  une  analyse  exhaustive  de  ces  deux  ensembles
d’institutions et de politiques que de définir un nouveau programme de recherche pour évaluer
les défis et les enjeux de l’inclusion de nouvelles parties prenantes dans le processus décisionnel
de la politique commerciale. 
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